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The history of research in finance and economics has been widely impacted by the field of Agent-
based Computational Economics (ACE). While at the same time being popular among natural
science researchers for its proximity to the successful methods of physics and chemistry for example,
the field of ACE has also received critics by a part of the social science community for its lack of
empiricism. Yet recent trends have shifted the weights of these general arguments and potentially
given ACE a whole new range of realism. At the base of these trends are found two present-day
major scientific breakthroughs: the steady shift of psychology towards a hard science due to the
advances of neuropsychology, and the progress of artificial intelligence and more specifically machine
learning due to increasing computational power and big data. These two have also found common
fields of study in the form of computational neuroscience, and human-computer interaction, among
others. We outline here the main lines of a computational research study of collective economic
behavior via Agent-Based Models (ABM) or Multi-Agent System (MAS), where each agent would
be endowed with specific cognitive and behavioral biases known to the field of neuroeconomics,
and at the same time autonomously implement rational quantitative financial strategies updated by
machine learning. We postulate that such ABMs would offer a whole new range of realism.
The field of finance and economics has used various ap-
proaches to model financial markets dynamics. Among
these we can historically distinguish three important
classes of models. The first and most encountered are
statistical models which are calibrated to fit times series
like past prices history. These can bring interesting re-
sults pertaining to general volatility [1, 2] or log-return
forecasting [3] as long as the variability of the parameters
of calibration is not too strong. The second are known as
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els which provide explicit agent-based microfoundations
for the sectoral dynamics and aggregate fluctuations [4].
Modern developments of DSGE models strive to add re-
alism to the basic model structure, accounting for agent
heteorgeneity, bounded rationality and imperfect learn-
ing, and (in the New Keynesian versions) replace the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis by market rigidities and
exogenous stochastic shocks to emulate true market en-
vironment conditions [5–7]. These two classes of models
have shown a variety of promising results over the years.
However if we consider a top-down approach to system in-
ference, we can say that they are based on rough approx-
imations of reality [8, 9], and will not explain the wealth
and diversity of price microstructure traditionally seen
in markets. This leads to a third class of models called
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) or sometimes Multi-Agent
Systems (MAS) to probe and emulate markets from a
pure bottom-up approach [10–12], and considering them
as the complex systems [13] that they truly are. Among
financial ABM models, we can also include order book
models [14, 15] even though some may see those as a
midway approach. In a financial ABM, market investors
or traders are modeled as agents trading together via an
order book (such as a double auction order books [16]).
This is a discrete-time algorithm taking in the trading
bids at t and offers of specific securities from all agents,
and matching them at transaction prices which then col-
lectively define the price of the market for such securities
at the time step t+ 1.
ABM have been used in many scientific disciplines [17–
19]. In economics, these models have emerged by way
of psychological learning models [20], evolutionary bi-
ology [21, 22], and especially game theory [23–27]. In
recent years, ABM also became popular as a tool to
study macroeconomics [28–31] — specifically, the impact
of trading taxes, market regulatory policies, quantitative
easing, and the general role of central banks [32]. ABMs
can also play an important role in analysis of the impact
of the cross-market structure [33].
From a regulatory point of view, this implies a general
stronger role for ABM to play [34]. Jean-Claude Trichet
declared for instance in 2010: ”As a policy-maker during
the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In
fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt
abandoned by conventional tools. [...] Agent-based mod-
eling dispenses with the optimization assumption and al-
lows for more complex interactions between agents. Such
approaches are worthy of our attention.”
Even if ABMs are often designed with many param-
eters and hence subject to the delicate issue of overfit-
ting, one of their biggest advantages is that they require
fewer assumptions (e.g normal distribution of returns,
no-arbitrage) than top-down models [35]. Added to this,
ABM display the famous complexity emergence proper
to bottom-up approaches [36] and can hence show com-
pletely new regimes of transitions, akin to phase transi-
tions in statistical physics [37]. However, being models,
ABMs are of course imperfect and need a thorough and
lengthy cross-market validation [38]. Yet at the same
time, one should keep in mind that such a general and
cautious validation of ABMs shall be in fact applicable
and necessary to any other model as well [39].
From now on we consider the application of ABMs
to financial markets. We shall note that among finan-
cial ABMs some exclusively pertain to high-frequency
trading [40, 41], while other take both high- and low-
frequency into account [42–44]. Another popular topic
of literature in financial ABMs is the emulation of the
widespread Minority Game [45, 46], which formally is
not a financial market problem, but a general game the-
ory problem which can be related to the financial issues
of pricing and forecasting.
In order to generate a dynamic trading activity in fi-
nancial ABMs, a basic economic assumption is that the
agents disagree on the present security price or trade at
different frequencies (which possibility is sometimes ex-
plicitly denied in economics literature [47]), and are hence
willing to long or short a same security at different prices.
In other words, there must be some sort of price disagree-
ment happening and an original pricing mechanism at
the discretion of each individual agent. In the literature,
this mechanism of pricing in financial ABMs has in gen-
eral been designed according to two basic mechanisms
of trading: in some models at least a part of the agents
trade in a random way as ‘noise traders’ [40, 41, 48–52],
and in other models agents use realistic trading strate-
gies known to real financial markets, depending on the
variability and stochasticity of the market [53–56].
I. ACCURACY
Over the years, economic research (and especially
econophysics research) has gradually discovered a certain
number of non-trivial statistical features of or stylized
facts about financial times series. These stylized facts
are based on variations in prices that have universal sta-
tistical properties in common from market to market,
over different types of instruments, and time periods.
Among these, those pertaining to returns distribution
or volatility clustering for example were gradually dis-
covered during the nineties: Kim-Markowitz [57], Levy-
Levy-Solomon [58–64], Cont-Bouchaud [65], Solomon-
Weisbuch [66], Lux-Marchesi [53, 67], Donangelo-
Sneppen [68–71], Solomon-Levy-Huang [72]. It was also
not before this time that ABM started to emulate these
stylized facts.
The importance of the universality of stylized facts to
really gauge financial markets comes from the fact that
the price evolutions of different markets may have very
different exogenous or endogenous causes. As a conse-
quence they highlight general underlying financial mech-
anisms that are market-independent, and which can in
turn be exploited for ABM architecture design. From
a scientific point of view, stylized facts are hence ex-
tremely interesting and their faithful emulation has been
an active topic of research in the past fifteen years or
so [73, 74]. Their definite characteristics has varied ever
so slightly over the years and across literature, but the
most widespread and unanimously accepted stylized facts
can in fact be grouped in three broad, mutually overlap-
ping categories:
Non-gaussian returns : the returns distribution is non-
gaussian and hence asset prices should not be modeled
as brownian randomwalks [75, 76], despite what is taught
in most text books, and applied in sell-side finance. In
particular the real distributions of returns are dissim-
ilar to normal distributions in that they are: (i) hav-
ing fatter tails and hence more extreme events, with the
tails of the cumulative distribution being well approx-
imated [75, 77] by a power law of exponent belonging
to the interval [2, 4] (albeit this is still the subject of a
discussion [78, 79] famously started by Mandelbrot [80]
and his Levy stable model for financial returns), (ii) neg-
atively skewed and asymmetric in many observed mar-
kets [81] with more large negative returns than large posi-
tive returns, (iii) platykurtic and as a consequence having
less mean-centered events [82], (iv) with multifractal k-
moments so that their exponent is not linear with k, as
seen in [83–86].
Clustered volatilities : market volatility tends to aggre-
gate or form clusters [2]. Therefore compared to av-
erage, the probability to have a large volatility in the
near-future is greater if it was large also in the near-
past [73, 87, 88]. Regardless of whether the next return
is positive or negative, one can thus say that large (resp.
small) return jumps are likely followed by the same [80],
and thus display some sort of long memory behavior [89].
Because volatilities and trading volumes are often corre-
lated, we also observe a related volume clustering.
Decaying auto-correlations : the auto-correlation function
of the returns of financial time series are basically zero
for any value of the auto-correlation lag, except for very
short lags (e.g. half-hour lags for intraday data) because
of a mean-reverting microstructure mechanism for which
there is a negative auto-correlation [81, 89]. This is some-
times feeding the general argument of the well-known Ef-
ficient Market Hypothesis [90, 91] that markets have no
memory and hence that one cannot predict future prices
based on past prices or information [87, 88]. According
to this view, there is hence no opportunity for arbitrage
within a financial market [77]. It has been observed how-
ever that certain non-linear functions of returns such as
squared returns or absolute returns display certain steady
auto-correlations over longer lags [89].
Since then, ABMs of financial markets have steadily
increased in realism and can generate progressively more
robust scaling experiments. We can specifically highlight
the potential of these simulations to forecast real financial
time series via reverse-engineering. A promising recent
perspective for such use of ABMs has been highlighted in
the field of statistics by [92–94]: the agent-based model
parameters are constrained to be calibrated and fit real fi-
nancial time series and then allowed to evolve over a given
time period as a basic forecast measure on the original
time series used for calibration. With this, one could thus
say that ABMs are now reaching Friedman’s [95] method-
ological requirement that a theory must be ”judged by its
predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is
intended to explain.”
II. CALIBRATION
Just as any other model, the parameters of the ABM
must be calibrated to real financial data in order to per-
form realistic emulation. This part of calibration is to-
gether with architecture design the most technical and
crucial aspect of the ABM [96]. Yet at the same time
in the literature most calibration techniques are done by
hand, so that the stylized facts are re-enacted in a satis-
factory way. Therefore so far the ABM calibration step
is often performed in way that is sub-optimal [48, 97, 98].
On the other hand, an efficient methodology for cal-
ibration would need two important steps. First a fully
automated meta-algorithm in charge of the calibration
should be incorporated, so that massive amount of fi-
nancial data could be treated and the aforementioned
scope of validity of ABM studied via cross-market vali-
dations [48, 99]. This is important as the robustness of
a calibration always relies on many runs of ABM sim-
ulations [100]. Second, this calibration meta-algorithm
should be working through the issues of overfitting and
underfitting, which may constitute a severe challenge due
to the ever-changing stochastic nature of financial mar-
kets.
Part of this calibration problem is to thoroughly and
cautiously define the parameter space. This step is par-
ticularly sensitive, since it can lead to potentially prob-
lematic simplifications. For instance, what should be the
size of the time step of the simulation? ABM with a daily
time tick will of course produce time series that are much
coarser than those coming from real financial data, which
include all sorts of intraday events [101–103].
III. TRENDS
As previously said, emergence and recent progress of
two separate fields of research will likely have a ma-
jor upcoming impact on economic and financial ABMs.
The first one is the recent developments in cognitive
neuroscience and neuroeconomics [104–108], which has
revolutionized behavioral economics with its ever lower
cost experimental methods of functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI), electro-encephalography (EEG),
or magneto-encephalography (MEG) applied to deci-
sion [109, 110] and game theories [111]. The second
one concerns the recent progress of machine learning
which has been possible in the last few years by the
improved computer power, and especially GPU comput-
ing [112], as well as the availability of big data to train
supervised algorithms and reach in some tasks superhu-
man performance [113–116]. Among the multiple ma-
chine learning approaches and algorithms, we can high-
light in particular the recent progress of reinforcement
learning [117–119], artificial neural networks [120–122],
Monte Carlo tree search [115], and multi-agent learn-
ing [114, 123, 124]. Furthermore, these have been com-
bined to work together in new types of unsupervised al-
gorithms that have given impressive results [125, 126],
raising concern about the scale of general societal impact
of artificial intelligence [127].
To the ABM field, this implies that the realism of
the economic agents can be greatly increased via these
two recent technological developments: the agents can
be endowed with numerous cognitive and behavioral bi-
ases emulating those of human investors for instance, but
also their trading strategies can be more faithful to real-
ity in the sense that they can be dynamic and versatile
depending on the general stochasticity or variability of
the market, thanks to the fact that via machine learning
they will learn to trade and invest. At a time where the
economy and financial markets are progressively more
and more automated, this impact of machine learning
on ABM should thus be explored. One should keep in
mind that the central challenge (and in fact hypothe-
ses) of ABM are the realism of the agents, but also the
realism of the economic transactions and interactions be-
tween the agents.
IV. APPLICATION
Besides studying the agents’ collective trading interac-
tions with one another, an ABM stock market simula-
tion could be used to probe the following specific fields
of study:
Market macrostructure: one could study how human cog-
nitive and behavioral biases change agents’ behaviour at
a level of market macrostructure. The two main topics
of market macrostructure that would be of interest are
naturally all those pertaining to systemic risk [128, 129]
(bubble and crash formation, problem of illiquidity), and
also those related to herding-type phenomena [130] (in-
formation cascades, rational imitation, reflexivity). A
key aspect of this work would be also to carefully cali-
brate and compare the stylized facts to real financial data
(we need to see standardized effects such as volatility
clustering, leptokurtic log-returns, fat tails, long mem-
ory in absolute returns). Indeed some of these macro-
effects have been shown to arise from other agent-based
market simulators [11, 131], however it is not yet fully un-
derstood how these are impacted by the agents learning
process nor their cognitive and behavioral biases such as
risk aversion, greed, cooperativity, intertemporality, and
the like.
Price formation: one could study how these biases
change the arbitrage possibilities in the market via their
blatant violation of the axioms of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis [132]. Indeed agent-based market simulators
so far have often relied on the use of the aforementioned
’noise traders’ in order to generate the necessary con-
ditions for basic business activity [12, 33, 133]. The
novel aspect here would be to go one step further and
replace this notion of purely random trading by imple-
menting specific neuroeconomic biases common to real
human behaviors. Another problem of past research in
agent-based stock market simulators is that these have
often relied on agents getting their information for price
forecasting from a board of technical indicators common
to all agents [134]. In contrast, we should develop agent
models that allow each agent to be autonomous and use
and ameliorate its own forecasting tools. This is a crucial
aspect in view of the well-known fact that information is
at the heart of price formation [135]. We hypothesize
that such agent learning dynamics is fundamental in ef-
fects based on market reflexivity and impact on price
formation, and hints to the role played by fundamental
pricing versus technical pricing of assets. Of major inter-
est is the issue of global market liquidity provision and
its relation to the law of supply and demand and bid-ask
spread formation [136–138].
Credit risk : one could study the effect of market evolu-
tionary dynamics when the agents are allowed to learn
and improve their trading strategy and cognitive biases
via machine learning. In other words, it would be inter-
esting to see the agents population survival rates [139–
141] (cf. credit risk), and overall price formation with re-
spect to the arbitrage-free condition of markets when we
increase the variability of the intelligence in the trading
agents [142]. Indeed, recent studies [133, 143, 144] sug-
gest that arbitrage opportunities in markets arise mainly
from the collective number of non-optimal trading deci-
sions that shift the prices of assets from their fundamen-
tal values via the law of supply and demand. Another
topic would be to compare such agent survivability with
Zipf’s law [141].
V. CONCLUSION
We have thus highlighted new possible exciting per-
spectives for financial ABM, where the agents would be
designed with neuroeconomic biases and having trading
or investment strategies updated by machine learning.
One should recall that the main argument against ABM,
and indeed their main challenge, has always been about
the realism of the agents, albeit one should also consider
the realism of the economic transactions. We thus argue
that these recent trends should set a totally new level of
realism for financial ABM
In particular, whereas early financial ABM generations
increased their realism of emulation of real stock markets
by re-enacting stylized facts gradually during the late
nineties, and whereas the issue of calibration is still un-
dergoing the process of automation so that ABM may be
validated on large scales of data, we expect these trends
to bring in several revolutionary breakthroughs, and the
emergence and recognition of ABM as the relevant tools
that they are in finance and economics.
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